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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF EVIDENCE
By
I.

ALAN

H.

BUCHOLTZ*

CRIMINAL CASES

In Garrison v. People' the petitioner was tried, convicted of
murder, and sentenced to death. A plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity had been entered, but a finding of sanity was returned. The
conviction and sentence were affirmed by the supreme court.2 A
few days before execution, Garrison filed a petition in the trial
court, with physician's affidavit attached, alleging that he was then
insane and had become so since the date on which judgment was
entered. Execution was stayed and a psychiatrist was appointed to
examine him. At a subsequent jury trial a finding of sanity was
entered to which Garrison filed a writ of error.
The assigned error was that the trial court excluded all evidence of the appellant's mental condition prior to January 20, 1960,
the date on which the original judgment and sentence were pronounced. Garrison's contention was that the court, relying on language in Leick v. People,3 excluded this evidence solely because it
antedated the imposition of sentence. Appellant urged that such
evidence was admissible, not to show mental condition at or before
the time of sentence, but to throw light on his true mental condition
at the time of the postsentence sanity trial. His mental illness, he
insisted, was hereditary and he sought to introduce a full family
history to show that his mental condition was " the logical culmina4
tion of a long, drawn-out process of mental deterioration.
The supreme court quoted the language from Leick that "The
sole and only issue to be determined ... was the defendant's sanity
or lack thereof occurring subsequent to conviction and sentence in
the criminal action." 5 This language, the court held, was not "tantamount to a declaration that any and all evidence of the mental
condition of the defendant prior to 'conviction and sentence in the
criminal action', however relevant it may be to his present mental
state, is inadmissible solely because it occurred prior to such date."6
In arriving at its final conclusion the court relied on an American Jurisprudence passage 7 and said:
[I] f evidence of the general type alluded to, supra, is otherwise competent, relevant and material, it is not inadmissible
solely because it occurred prior to the time judgment and
sentence entered in the criminal proceeding, or because it
relates to his mental condition prior to such time . .. .8
The opinion admitted that the Am. Jur. section presupposes an insanity plea relating to the time of the commission of the crime and
not to one interposed after sentence but said that "in logic there is
no valid reason for applying a different rule where the issue is
* Senior student, University of Denver College of Low.
1 378 P.2d 401 (Colo. 1963).
2 Garrison v. People, 147 Colo. 385, 364 P.2d 197 (1961).
3 140 Colo. 564, 345 P.2d 1054 (1959).
4 378 P.2d at 403.
5 140 Colo. at 568, 345 P.2d 1054, 1056.
6 378 P.2d at 403.
7 20 Am. Jur. Evidence § 349 (1939). See 378 P.2d at 403, 404.
8 378 P.2d at 404.
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whether a person 'has become and remains' insane since the imposition of sentence. In either event the ultimate issue is the sanity, or
lack of it, of a particular individual as of a date certain."9
It is no doubt true that the trauma of sentence and impending
execution may react on a pre-existing mental condition and cause
postsentence insanity. The propriety of the decision, therefore, cannot be argued. The court might have, however, found sounder legal
principles on which to base its opinion. Two fairly recent Pennsylvania decisions are in point. The first, Commonwealth v. Gossard,0
held that in determining the petitioner's mental condition at post9 Ibid.

10 385 Pa. 312, 123 A.2d 258 (1956).
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sentence proceedings, the evidence at the murder trial as well as the
entire life record of the petitioner may be considered. The second,
Commonwealth v. Ballem," held that the language in Gossard was
not mandatory, but consideration of the prior life record was at
least discretionary.
Stretching the Am. Jur. quotation to meet the needs of this
case is unnecessary in light of the statutory tests of insanity in
Colorado. The "right-wrong plus irresistable impulse"'12 test is used
to determine criminal insanity at the time of the commission of the
wrongful act, while the postsentence test is whether the prisoner
has "sufficient intelligence to understand the proceedings, the pur'13
pose of his punishment and the impending fate awaiting him.
Certainly, an adjudication of sanity based on the right-wrong, irresistable impulse test should not be, in effect, res judicata as to the
"intelligence" test.
The differences in the amount and burden of proof required in
the two sanity trials might provide further basis for the decision.
At the initial trial the prosecution has the burden of proving sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt 14 after the defense has raised the issue
with some evidence. At the postsentence sanity trial the petitioner
has, by statute, the burden of proving his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.' 5 It is clear that since the burden of proof is on
the prosecution in the first instance, the full mental history of the
defendant may not, or need not, be presented at that trial by the
defense. In addition, since the postsentence sanity trial is discretionary, 16 an affidavit of a psychiatrist usually accompanies the
petition to convince the judge of the validity of the alleged insanity.
In preparing his findings the psychiatrist must utilize the individual's full life history. To allow a sanity trial based on such affidavit
and then to exclude much of the material on which it was based is
inconsistent. The foregoing discussion could, it is suggested, bulwark
the opinion of the court.
The question of what evidence is admissible at a postsentence
sanity trial is not one-sided. The opposing argument is based on the
following:
11391 Pa. 626, 139 A.2d 534 (1958).
12Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-1(2) (1953). "The applicable test of insanity in such cases shall be,
and the jury shall be so instructed: 'A person who is so diseased in mind at the time of the act as
to be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong with respect to that act, or being able so to
distinguish, has suffered such an impairment of mind by disease as to destroy the will power and
render him incapable of choosing the right and refraining from doing the wrong, is not accountable; and this is true howsoever such insanity may be manifested, whether by irresistable impulse
or otherwise. But care should be taken not to confuse such mental disease with moral obliquity,
mental depravity, or passion growing out of anger, revenge, hatred or other motives, and kindred
evil conditions, for when the act is induced by any of these causes the person is accountable to
the law.' "
13 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-6(8) (1953). "...
[W]hen the issue is whether the defendant has
become insane since judgment and sentence, and the punishment is death, the following shall be
the applicable test, and the jury shall be so instructed: 'The defendant is not to be considered as
insane if he has sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of the proceeding against him, the
charge of which he was convicted, the purpose of his punishment, and the impending fate which
awaits him, and has sufficient mind to know any facts which would make his punishment unlawful
and to communicate such facts to his attorney or to the court.' "
14 Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 544, 322 P.2d 674 (1956); Martz v. People, 114 Colo. 278, 162 P.2d
408 (1945); Arridy v. People, 103 Colo. 29, 82 P.2d 757 (1938); Graham v. People, 95 Colo. 544, 38
P.2d 87 (1934); Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 22 P.2d 1109 (1933).
15 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-6(7) (1953). "The trial of the issue of sanity or insanity of the
defendant in this section shall be deemed a civil proceeding, and the jury shall consist of twelve
persons . . . . When the issue is whether the defendant has thus become and then is insane, the
burden shall be upon the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence insanity at the
time and as occurring since the commission of the offense, or since the verdict of guilty, or since
the judgment, as the case may be ....
" See Leick v. People, 140 Colo. 564, 345 P.2d 1054 (1959).
16 Leick v. People, 140 Colo. 564, 345 P.2d 1054 (1959); Berger v. People, 123 Cola. 403, 231
P.2d 799 (1951); Bulger v. People, 61 Colo. 187, 156 Pac. 800 (1910).
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Sanity of an accused at the time he committed the offense
is conclusively determined by the judgment of conviction
and it cannot be again raised in a proceeding to determine
the question of his sanity before execution of a capital sentence on him. Accordingly, the only questions for trial are
whether the accused has become insane or a lunatic since
the entry of the original judgment and whether he is insane
or a lunatic at the time of the present proceeding; and since
the judgment of conviction conclusively raises a presumption of sanity at the time of the offense, the burden is on
the accused to show by a preponderance of evidence that
he has become insane
subsequent to the final judgment and
7
before execution.1
Strict interpretation of this passage and the statutory requirement
that it must be specifically pleaded that the insanity arose after the
imposition of sentence leads to the supposition that the evidence at
trial should be restricted. 18 Of the arguments, however, those favoring the liberal admission of evidence appear to be more plausible
in the light of modern psychiatric concepts.
Another 1963 case, Coppinger v. People,19 strongly reiterated
that under the Colorado Habitual Criminal Act 20 certified copies of
prior convictions are insufficient to prove such convictions. The
statute demands authenticated copies and the court will accept no
less. The opinion pointed out that what constitutes an authenticated
copy was stated explicitly in Brown v. People2 1 and that the "additional certificates of authenticity by the judge ... and ...the clerk
. ..are essential before the documents may be received under the
statute. '22 There can be no question now about the standard of proof
required, unless
the defendant admits his identity and the former
23
convictions.
The major issue on appeal in Johnson v. People24 was the denial
by the trial court of a motion to quash a robbery information under
the doctrine of autrefois acquit.25 A subsidiary element, but one of
importance to Colorado law, was the admission into evidence of the
first-trial testimony of a witness who refused to testify at the second
trial. Colorado has heretofore adopted the rule of admissibility- of
such testimony when the witness whose testimony was sought was
deceased or otherwise unavailable and the defense had had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the first trial. 26 But in
Johnson the witness was available.
Looking to other jurisdictions, the court adopted the rationale
of a Kansas case2 7 and held that the true test "was not so much the
17 24 C.J.S.Criminal Law § 1618 (1961).
18 See People v. Eldred, 103 Colo. 334, 86 P.2d 248 (1938). The entire Colorado law of insanity
is discussed in: Cohen, "Insanity and the Law: Toward a Rational Development of Criminal
Responsibility," 39 Dicta 325 (1962).
19 380 P.2d 19 (Colo. 1963).
20 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-13-2 (1953). "Evidence of former convictions. - On any trial under the
provisions of this article, a duly authenticated copy of the record of former convictions and judgments of any court of record for any of said crimes against the party indicted or informed against
shall be prima facie evidence of such convictions and may be used in evidence against such party."
21 124 Colo. 412, 238 P.2d 847 (1951).
22 380 P.2d at 20.
23 Hackett v. Tinsley, 143 Colo. 203, 352 P.2d 799 (1960).
24 384 P.2d 454 (Colo. 1963).
25 This issue is discussed in this year's "One Year Review of Constitutional Law," supra page 77.
26 Henwood v. People, 57 Colo. 544, 143 Pac. 373 (1914); Young v. People, 54 Colo. 293, 130
Pac. 1011 (1913).
27 State v. Stewart, 85 Kan. 404, 116 Pac. 489 (1911).
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'unavailability' of the witness, but the 'unavailability' of his testimony and that a witness who-though present-refused to testify is
just as surely 'unavailable' as the witness who stepped across a state
line to avoid service of a subpoena. '2 The decision on this point has
further support from case law and secondary authority.2 9 Under the
general rule the first-trial testimony is admitted when the witness
is present but claims a privilege not to testify."0 The Colorado law,
on the basis of Johnson, goes one step further and allows the use
of the testimony when the witness does not claim any privilege, but
merely refuses to testify. If it so desires, the court may limit this
decision in the future since in Johnson the witness was serving a
life sentence in the penitentiary and the trial court was "handicapped as to the possible punishment which it could impose under
its contempt powers for his refusal to testify.""1
II.

CIVIL CASES

The use of blood test results to overcome the presumption of
legitimacy was the subject of Beck v. Beck. 32 On the basis of 6 blood
test, taken after the trial pursuant to agreement made before trial,
the lower court granted judgment n.o.v., and the mother brought a
writ of error. In the opinion, the court recognized that the presumption of legitimacy is one of the strongest presumptions known to
the law and can be overcome only by proof of non-access or impotency of the husband, 33 but cited a Massachusetts case which held
that the rule does not require proof on either ground to a degree of
impossibility.3 4 The court quoted from the Colorado blood test statute 35 and gave this interpretation:
As we read the statute a reputed father is entitled as a matter of right to have such tests made; he is further entitled
to have the tests received in evidence when definite exclusion is established, provided a proper foundation is laid for
the introduction of such evidence. The words 'may be received in evidence' in
the act must have that effect if they
36
are to be meaningful.
The evidence of the tests so admitted is competent to overcome the
presumption of legitimacy. 37 This is the
general rule in jurisdictions
38
having a statute similar to Colorado's.
Nelson v. Grissom39 concerned a dispute about whether a mother
who had full custody of two minor children, subject to the father's
visitation rights, could take the children to California to live in a
'8 384 P.2d at 457.
29 People v. Picket, 339 Mich. 294, 63 N.W.2d 681 (1954). See 20 Am. Jur. Evidence §§ 686-7C6
(1939); 15 A.L.R. 495 (1921); 45 A.L.R.2d 1354 (1956).
30 See 45 A.L.R.2d 1354 (1956).
31 384 P.2d at 457.
32 384 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1963).
33 Lanford v. Lanford, 377 P.2d 115 (Colo. 1962).
34 Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 299 Mass. 7, 11 N.E.2d 482 (1937).
35 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 52-1-27 (Perm. Supp. 1960). "Blood grouping tests - costs. - In any action,
suit, or proceeding wherein the paternity of any child or children is denied, the court on the motion
of the reputed father shall order the mother, her child or children, and the reputed father to submit
to one or more blood grouping tests by a duly qualified physician or other duly qualified person
to determine whether or not the reputed father can be excluded as being the father of said child or
children, and the results of such tests may be received in evidence, but only in cases where
definite exclusion is established.
36 384 P.2d at 732.
37 Beck v. Beck, 384 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1963).
38 See 46 A.L.R.2d 1000 (1956).
39 392 P.2d 991 (Colo. 1963).
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home presided over by their stepfather. At the hearing, Nelson, the
father, attempted to introduce records and testimony of the new
husband's mental unfitness. Nelson established that Grissom, the
new husband, had threatened his own children by a prior marriage
with a loaded rifle and had on that occasion shot himself. Grissom
was already settled in California and was not present. The court
excluded the hospital records and doctor's testimony on the ground
that they were privileged.
After considering the facts, the supreme court decided that
evidence of Grissom's emotional stability, or lack of it, was material
to the issue of whether or not it was in the best interest of the
children to permit their removal to California where they would
live in Grissom's home. Nelson, it said, should have been given an
opportunity in the trial court to show that the records and testimony were not privileged and that each was otherwise competent.
"Statements made by one to a doctor are not ipso facto privileged,
but are privileged only if they meet all the several requirements
contained in C.R.S. '53, 153-1-7 (4) ."41 The case is unique in that it
is not the unfitness of the natural parent which is being questioned,
40 Id. at 993.
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but that of a stepparent with whom the children will have to live.
However, the court said in the leading case of Wilson v. Mitchell:
Thus by natural law, by common law, and likewise the statutes of this state, the natural parents are entitled to the
custody of their minor children, except when they are unsuitable persons to be entrusted with their care, control
and education, or when some exceptional circumstances
appear which render41such custody inimicable to the best
interests of the child.
The above quote, combined with the general rule that the welfare
of the child controls, 42 is sufficient to account for the decision.
Another case, Lee v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 43 reaffirmed the Colorado rule relating to the probative value of negative evidence. That
rule is:
The probative force of negative testimony depends largely
upon circumstances. In some circumstances, its probative
force may be so slight as to reach the vanishing point; in
other circumstances, such testimony may be more persuasive than the positive testimony of some witnesses. It is only
when it is so clear that such testimony has no probative
value whatever that reasonable men would not differ in
their conclusions with reference thereto, that courts are
justified in disregarding it on the
ground that it does not
44
rise to the dignity of evidence.
In Lee, the court also held that by showing a railroad investigator
could not testify coherently on deposition without refreshing his
memory from a file covering the accident, the plaintiff had demonstrated a right to have the file produced by subpoena duces tecum
under Colorado Rule 45 (b), subject to any protective orders by the
court.
The decision in Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial
Com'n 45 clarified and expanded a prior holding that no medical
proof of causation was necessary in workmen's compensation cases.
The court said:
[W] e now add [to the prior decision] that if the rule were
otherwise an unattended injury or death in many cases
could never be compensated. All that is necessary to warrant the finding of a causal connection between the accident
and the disability, is to show facts and circumstances which
would indicate with reasonable probability that the injury
or death
resulted from or was precipitated by the acci46
dent.
The foregoing 1963 cases are the ones chosen as having significant impact in the law of evidence. The remaining cases, concerning such matters as judicial notice, corroboration of confessions
made extra-judicially, weight of testimony, parol evidence, admission of documents to refresh recollection, impeachment and waiver
of privilege or objection, follow well-established rules and add little
to the further development of the law.
4148 Colo. 454, 466,
42 Coulter v. Coulter,
43 381 P.2d 35 (Colo.
44 Colorado & S. Ry.
45 380 P.2d 28 (Colo.
46 Id. at 30.

111 Pac. 21, 26 (1910). (Emphasis added.)
141 Colo. 236, 347 P.2d 492 (1959).
1963).
v. Honaker, 92 Colo. 239, 248, 19 P.2d 750, 763 (1933).
1963).

